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Abstract 
The enterprise is an historical phenomenon specific to capitalism. It is a fictional agent 
created by accounting and sanctioned by law. It is based on capital and its purpose is to yield 
monetary profit. Within the framework of the market economy, production is organized 
according to the decisions and actions of the aggregate of these artificially created agents. 
This paper demonstrates that the “entrepreneur” as used in economic theory is nothing but a 
personification of the enterprise. In the most renowned economic theories of entrepreneurship, 
the entrepreneurs are supposed to be in possession of the resources they employ. Yet the 
functions which these theories ascribe to the entrepreneurs implicitly presuppose that the 
latter not only possess resources, but that they actually own them. Without capital, which 
grants the power to obtain property rights in resources, entrepreneurs would not be able to 
bear the losses that come along with the entrepreneurial functions. The theories violate their 
own definitions by changing their object from a “pure” and property-less entrepreneur to a 
capital-owning agent. These theories can be reinterpreted, therefore, as applying not to the 
pure entrepreneur but to the capital-based enterprise. They then become theories of how and 
according to which principles enterprises organize the production process in capitalism. In 
contrast to the theoretical construct of the entrepreneur, enterprises are even present, though 
only implicitly, in neoclassical equilibrium analysis. They provide the setting of optimal 
decision making and therein constitute the tacit rationale of the notorious assumptions of 
complete foresight and perfect rationality. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the immense importance of entrepreneurs for the market economy, economists have 
yet to find a way to integrate them into the main body of economic theory. The present paper 
does not add another theory that once more situates the entrepreneurs outside the equilibrium 
framework of neoclassical economics. Instead, it reinterprets the established theories of the 
entrepreneur and unites them in an explanation of how the production process is organized in 
capitalist societies. In this, it shows that the idea of the entrepreneur is no less a part of 
equilibrium economics than of disequilibrium economics.   
In order to be able to integrate the idea of the entrepreneur into the neoclassical framework, 
we must accept that we are dealing with a historically specific phenomenon. Current 
economic theories of the entrepreneur fall short because they define the entrepreneurs, 
explicitly or implicitly, as universal agents and thus put them on an equal footing with the 
technical production factors of labor, land, and the produced means of production. 
Entrepreneurs, however, do not have a function in the production process as such. Rather, 
their function lies on a different level: the level of organization. And in contrast to the 
technical problems of production which are in principle the same in all eras and all economic 
systems, the organization of production is historically specific. In some ancient societies, the 
patriarch might have directed the production process personally; in socialism, it is the 
planning board that organizes the employment of the production factors; and in capitalism, it 
is profit-oriented and capital-based enterprises which perform this function. These enterprises 
are “unique” to this economic system, as Lewin (2011: 177) expresses it.   
In accordance with this observation, the present paper argues that the universal theoretical 
construction of the “pure entrepreneur,” employed by most theories of the entrepreneur, 
cannot be thought through to the end. The established theories of the entrepreneur can be 
shown to tacitly shift their object, at one point or another, from the pure entrepreneur to the 
capital-based enterprise. In short, these theories are actually theories of the enterprise, not of 
the pure entrepreneur.   
Once they have been reinterpreted in this way, the different theories of the entrepreneur can 
be shown to dovetail in an explanation of how and according to which principles enterprises 
determine the use of the factors of production in capitalism. Furthermore, it can be shown that 
the enterprise, as opposed to the pure entrepreneur, has a place even within the equilibrium 
framework of neoclassical economics. Based on the distinction between the sphere of 
production and the sphere of organization, the place of the enterprise in equilibrium can be 
identified as the rationale behind the often criticized assumption of perfectly rational and 
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informed agents. This assumption amounts to a translation into mathematical language of a 
perfectly functioning organization of the production process by profit-oriented enterprises 
according to the wishes of consumers and factor owners. Therefore, although enterprises are 
not visible in neoclassical micro-theory, they are, on the level of organization, an implicit but 
necessary precondition of it.       
Following up on recent claims by Hodgson (2014; 2015a), section 2 closely examines some 
important historically specific features of capitalism in order to better understand the 
organization of this economic system. It starts from Karl Marx’s famous formula Money – 
Commodity – Money’ and, by drawing on the extensions to this formula by Zwiedineck-
Südenhorst (1930) and Braun (2015),  provides a schematic description of the way the 
production process is actually organized in the market economy. The main agent in this regard 
is the enterprise, a fictional agent based on capital, created by accounting, and usually 
sanctioned by law (Stauss 2007; Biondi 2007). It operates in what will be called the “business 
sphere,” the sphere of organization of capitalism. Section 2 also presents the reasons why, 
despite the tenet of methodological individualism, it is the enterprise that is chosen as the 
central agent in this paper and not the entrepreneur. Section 3 makes two important and 
interrelated points. First, it demonstrates that the common theories of the entrepreneur do not 
succeed in their attempts to isolate the entrepreneurial function. Regardless of whether they 
maintain that the entrepreneur is the one who brings about equilibrium (Kirzner 1973), the 
one who destroys equilibrium and thus creates development and progress (Schumpeter 1911), 
or the one who bears the uncertainty which prevails in disequilibrium (Knight 1921; Mises 
1949), they must all amalgamate their entrepreneur with the capitalist, otherwise the 
respective entrepreneurial function cannot be fulfilled. The argument partly extends the 
criticism that has been put forward by Hébert and Link (2009) and Foss and Klein (2012). A 
major shortcoming of these theories is that the entrepreneurs are only considered to be in 
possession and control of the resources they allocate. They must also, however, own some 
capital in order to bear the consequences of their actions, especially the potential emergence 
of losses. Second, section 3 also shows that the impossibility to separate the entrepreneur 
from the capitalist is due to the fact that the said theories are not universal, despite assertions 
to the contrary, but actually relate to the historically specific organizational framework of the 
market economy. Therefore, the agent they are implicitly talking about is not the “pure” 
entrepreneur, but the enterprise as presented in section 2. In section 4 I show that, after some 
mild reinterpretation, these theories dovetail perfectly with each other in a description of how 
and according to which principles the enterprise organizes the market economy. The 
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enterprise is alert to price differentials, creates new lines of production and business, and 
takes on the uncertainty of producing for the market which would otherwise have to been 
borne by the owners of the production factors. In performing these functions, the enterprise 
occupies the center stage of the production process under capitalism as it was indicated by 
Cantillon (1755), Say (1803), and Hawley (1927). Section 5 finally qualifies Baumol’s (1968, 
2010) often repeated claim that there is no place for the entrepreneur in neoclassical 
equilibrium economics. In this section, I show that the organizational sphere of capitalism 
with its profit-oriented enterprise is actually the rationale behind the often criticized 
assumptions of perfect rationality and complete foresight. 
    
2. The organization of production in the market economy 
2.1 The business sphere         
The factors of production – labor, land, and the produced means of production – are a 
necessary part of all production processes. They are universal and general technical inputs to 
all human production in all thinkable forms of societies, no matter whether we look at Stone 
Age, Soviet communism, or modern capitalism. The definition of these factors of production 
can therefore rest on rather technical criteria, e.g., their durability or the mode of their 
reproduction. With the entrepreneur, however, economists try to add someone to this picture 
who, it will be seen, is not a universal factor of production. The entrepreneur does not belong 
to the sphere of production but to the sphere of organization which is not universal but 
historically specific.      
The argument that each epoch of history is characterized by a particular way of organizing the 
production process has been stressed by Karl Marx, the American Institutionalists, and the 
German Historical School. The production process – the technical collaboration of production 
factors in the creation of the product – never stands by itself. It is always embedded in a 
sphere that is located on a different level and gives meaning to it. Robinson Crusoe combines 
the factors because he wants to provide for his personal subsistence. A socialist planning 
board does so because it pursues social objectives, be they the provision of the citizens 
according to their needs or the victory in an arms race. In modern capitalism this is done by 
enterprises whose purpose is to breed money out of money by investing it in input factors, 
combining them, and selling the resulting product on the market. I now analyze the principle 
according to which enterprises organize the production process under capitalism. In 
subsection 2.2, I explain why I chose to call the central agent ‘the enterprise,’ not ‘the 
entrepreneur,’ which seems to be an undue anthropomorphism. 
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The gist of the way that enterprises organize the production process shines through in Karl 
Marx’s famous formula   
 
Money – Commodity – Money’ 
 
The be-all and end-all of a typical profit-oriented enterprise in capitalism is the ‘proliferation’ 
of money. Actions in the organizational sphere of capitalism start with an investment of a 
certain amount of money and end, if everything works out as planned and hoped for, with 
money revenues exceeding investment. Marx’s formula captures why the production factors 
of land, labor, and produced means of production – which are nothing but the “commodities” 
– are set in motion in capitalism: they are bought for money in order to make more money, 
i.e., they are part of business. That is why I am going to call the organizational sphere of 
capitalism the business sphere. 
How do the monetary processes which take place in the business sphere accomplish the 
organization of production? Zwiedineck-Südenhorst (1930: 1069), a member of the Historical 
School of Economics, elaborated on Marx’s formula in order to better illustrate the business 
sphere of capitalism and described the production process therein with a scheme that was 
recently adapted and elaborated on by Braun (2015: 33). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
This scheme illustrates the logic of production in the business sphere. Enterprises do not 
combine the factors of production in order to merely produce ouput. These technical events 
are but means to a superordinate end. Enterprises are ultimately interested in the processes 
that occur in the business sphere which frames the production process. For them, the purpose 
of production is to allow for money revenue in excess of money investment. The standard by 
which the success of production is measured and in respect of which it is organized is 
profitability – the relationship between these two monetary magnitudes. The question for an 
Figure 1: Production within the business sphere 
Land 
Labor 
Produced means of 
production 
Investment of money Product Money revenue 
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enterprise is not whether production has been successful, or whether the combination of land, 
labor, and produced means of production made sense from a technical point of view, but only 
whether its money investment has paid off (Liefmann 1928: 11). In line with this, the 
accounting system of enterprises does not calculate profits and dividends in relation to some 
technical features of the production process, but to the money figures which belong to the 
business sphere. 
Adam Smith’s famous metaphor of the “Invisible Hand” was supposed to convey exactly the 
paradox that seems to be inherent in this situation. How is it possible that the technical 
production process is organized by self-interested and profit-oriented enterprises that do not 
care about the technical results of production? I will revert to this question in sections 3 and 4 
where I show how the established theories of the entrepreneur can be applied to the 
explanation as to how the business sphere organizes production.  
 
2.2 The enterprise as the central agent in the business sphere 
In section 2.1, I have chosen to call the agents in the business sphere ‘the enterprise,’ and not 
‘the entrepreneur.’ This is a procedure against which Jensen and Meckling (1976: 311) 
famously warned in their classical paper. For them, the personification of the firm is 
“seriously misleading” because “[t]he firm is not an individual.” Behind what is called the 
firm there is a “complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals […] are 
brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations.” As Gindis (2009: 27) 
notes, the contract and the transaction are generally considered to be the basic unit of analysis 
and the essence of all forms of economic organization. 
I do not maintain that the enterprise is a rational and conscious entity that acts in and of itself. 
The enterprise consists of a network of contracts between real persons (or organization that 
themselves consist of real persons) who have various claims on its capital and its profit. As a 
system of individual acts it can (and arguably must) be analyzed on the basis of 
methodological individualism (Teubner 1988: 132).  
Even Jensen and Meckling (1976: 310 f.) admit, however, that enterprises are treated as 
individuals before the law. Legal practice has sanctioned the idea that an enterprise can be 
regarded as an entity by assuming a fictional legal personality. And even though the enterprise 
is only a fictional entity, it should be clear that the enterprise is not an artificial construct by 
some economic theorists. It is a fiction that is sanctioned by law in capitalist societies. Gindis 
(2015: 1), for example, points out that it has the “capacity for property, contract, and 
litigation.”  
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The reason why I chose this fictional entity – the enterprise – as the central agent in the 
business sphere, and not the entrepreneur, is that the well-known theories of the entrepreneur 
are actually theories of the enterprise. So to make this clear at the outset, I do not maintain 
that the object of the theory of the entrepreneur should necessarily be the enterprise. What I 
try to show is that it unconsciously is this object. That it is not completely far-fetched to focus 
on the enterprise becomes clear if we have another look at the logic of action in the business 
sphere. 
As was shown above, the starting point of any action in this sphere must be money; money 
with which production factors can be purchased in order to profit from the (expected) sales on 
the market. A person in itself – a “pure” entrepreneur so to speak – is not enough to decide the 
fate of any production factor. Without the power to move the factors according to one’s 
wishes, one cannot start any actions in the business sphere. The power to purchase goods and 
services, therefore, is a central requirement for the agents who want to act in this sphere.  
In this regard, it is important to note that the proliferation of money via the investment of 
money has also been called the “process of circulation of capital” – the subtitle of the second 
volume of Marx’s Das Kapital. Capital, in this sense, can be defined as all business assets 
which are destined for acquisition and evaluated in terms of their (actual or estimated) 
historical money costs. As money can be a business asset, too, the definition comprises all 
stages of the process described in figure 1 (with “labor” referring to labor services only, not 
laborers). It should go without saying that this definition of capital deviates from the usual 
ones in that it does not consider capital to be a production factor (Hodgson 2014; 2015a). 
So a different way of saying that money is the starting point of action in the business sphere is 
that capital is and must be at the basis of the actors in the business sphere. In capitalism, 
capital is the power that allows agents to organize the technical production process and to 
move the factors of production. And here we see why it suggests itself to pick the enterprise 
as the agent of the business sphere: the enterprise is an agent that is actually based on and 
unthinkable without capital. It is an artificially created actor whose purpose is to yield profit 
on the money – the capital – that has originally been invested in it.  
As Biondi (2007: 249; 2013: 397, 404) explains, an enterprise is created by artificially 
separating capital from its owners by financial accounting. The enterprise thus constitutes 
what can be called a fictional, capital-based person; it has also been termed an “accounting 
entity” (Stauss 2007: 230; Liefmann 1928: 14). In the words of Werner Sombart (1919: 101), 
the enterprise “assumes a separate existence” and becomes “an entity which emerges as a 
subject conducting individual economic acts and which leads a separate life, outlasting the life 
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of individuals.” Sombart (1919: 119) adds that the creation of a separate fictional actor is one 
of the main purposes of double-entry bookkeeping which “accomplishes the ultimate 
separation of the sum of money invested acquisitionally, i.e., in order to make profit, from all 
natural purposes of subsistence.” 
As I concentrate on the enterprise as an entity, it is not necessary to distinguish between 
equity capital and borrowed capital. From the point of view of the enterprise and its 
accounting system, both forms of capital are involved in the acquisitive activities as “entity 
capital” (Biondi 2013: 397). In this regard, one word must be said about companies without 
limited liability. Sometimes it happens that stockholders of an unlimited enterprise are forced 
by law to remargin capital in order to cover liabilities. In essence, this means that the capital 
of the unlimited enterprise is not completely separated from the private wealth of its owner or 
owners. The enterprise may be an accounting entity, in this case, but legally it does not stand 
on its own feet. So far as this is the case, it is fine to speak of those real persons who share 
into the capital risk of the enterprise as actual “entrepreneurs.” They are persons who are 
directly connected to their enterprise by shouldering a part of the losses that might be 
involved in the business actions of the latter. Yet, it must not be forgotten that even in these 
cases the real person is only an entrepreneur – a part of the enterprise – to the extent that his 
private wealth can be seized in order to cover liabilities of the enterprise. One could also say 
that the capital of the enterprise extends to the private wealth of its owners or shareholders 
and that they therefore can be called entrepreneurs. 
 
3. The enterprise in the business sphere as the object of the theory of the entrepreneur 
The enterprise does not belong to the sphere of production, but to the sphere of organization 
of capitalism which I have called the business sphere. The profit-oriented enterprise is an 
historical phenomenon specific to capitalism which is either not at all or only tangentially 
present in other economic systems (like socialism). Economists, however, have tried to find a 
concept that captures the idea of an organizing agent but still fits into the universal and 
ahistorical models of economics. They tend to define the entrepreneur in a universal way, as 
an agent who is on the same level as the factors of production, or even a fourth factor of 
production (e.g. Baumol 2010: 188), and who therefore has a certain function that is not only 
relevant in the market economy, but everywhere humans live and act. Schultz (1975: 832), for 
example, bemoans that the concept of the entrepreneur is restricted to “businessmen” and 
wants it to include all individuals who are “in the act of reallocating their resources;” he 
mentions laborers, housewives, students, and consumers.  
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This section demonstrates that the attempts to define a “pure entrepreneur” who fulfils 
nothing but a general entrepreneurial function have failed. The theories that are based on these 
definitions all tacitly scrap the idea of the “pure” and universal entrepreneur at some point. 
The core of the problem is related to a general confusion that Hodgson (2015b) noticed in the 
economics of property rights. The assumed entrepreneurial functions are supposed to rest 
merely on the possession of and the control over resources. Yet, in each of the definitions, the 
entrepreneurial function not only necessitates control over resources, but actual property 
rights in them. The entrepreneur, in other words, must not be pure, but has to be an owner of 
capital which grants the power to obtain property rights in resources. What these theories are 
implicitly discussing, then, is not a pure entrepreneur of any kind, but rather the enterprise in 
the business sphere.  
 
3.1 Entrepreneurship as alertness to unexploited opportunities of profit-making 
According to Israel Kirzner (1973), the most important feature of entrepreneurship is the 
alertness to so far unexploited opportunities to profitable actions. He emphasizes the 
entrepreneur’s ability to discover profitable opportunities already existing but not detected. 
The entrepreneur exploits these opportunities and thus makes them disappear.  In more 
technical language, the entrepreneur spots disequilibrium and generates a tendency towards 
equilibrium.  
To be sure, Kirzner is well aware of the hypothetical character of his association of alertness 
with a special class of people, i.e., the entrepreneurs. He explicitly approves the point of view 
according to which each human action contains an entrepreneurial element, and he (1973: 31) 
emphasizes that, therefore, also each acting human displays a certain amount of alertness. It is 
a mere theoretical construction when Kirzner isolates the element of alertness and assigns it to 
persons he labels the “pure entrepreneurs.” Kirzner (1973: 33) assumes that all decision-
makers but the pure entrepreneurs are passive, optimizing price takers who simply optimize 
against the background of assumed data. Only the pure entrepreneurs carry the entrepreneurial 
element, that is, alertness. It is important to stress that Kirzner does not mean that the 
entrepreneur is an accounting or legal fiction that is actually used in real life, like the 
enterprise. Rather he takes the entrepreneur as a theoretical makeshift that allows economists 
to grasp the entrepreneurial function. 
Kirzner seems to succeed in isolating the entrepreneurial function from the factors of 
production, but also and especially from capital, understood as financial power. Kirzner’s 
pure entrepreneur does not own capital (Kirzner 1973: 38; Foss and Klein 2012: 34). In order 
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to be alert, one needs to have possession of and control over resources, but one does not need 
any proper funds; it is enough to find another person who owns funds and who is willing to 
lend them to pure, alert entrepreneurs. As Ikeda (1990: 78) puts it, Kirzner’s pure 
entrepreneur is not a “resource owner,” but rather “marshals resources from their owners in 
the pursuit of profit opportunities.”  
Kirzner’s theory has been criticized for ignoring uncertainty (Hébert and Link 2009: 88). The 
alertness to opportunities can only explain entrepreneurial gains, not entrepreneurial losses, 
because the pure and penniless entrepreneur could never suffer a loss. How can you bear a 
loss without owning any funds? To discover a free ten-dollar bill within one’s grasp, that is, 
something obtainable for no costs at all (Kirzner 1973: 39), may be an incident of alertness – 
although it would better be termed “luck” (Demsetz 1983: 277) – but it does not explain the 
emergence of profit and loss. Kirzner’s concept of alertness, whose function is to discover 
opportunities for profitable change after all, would have to be combined with a state of 
certainty where all changes have already been factored in so that no losses can evolve (see 
Knight 1921: 37). Kirzner therefore provides a theory of entrepreneurship that is incomplete 
(Hébert and Link 2009: 88; Foss and Klein 2012: 66). His attempt to completely separate the 
entrepreneur from the capitalist fails because he must implicitly assume static conditions in 
order to protect the property-less entrepreneur from being subject to losses. In equilibrium, 
however, the function of alertness is redundant; and in disequilibrium, where losses are 
inherent, the task of being alert can only be fulfilled by someone who owns funds (or some 
form of collateral) and can withstand a loss. Therefore, the entrepreneur must also command 
capital. 
That Kirzner’s theory is not a theory of the pure entrepreneur but of the enterprise in the 
business sphere becomes clear even by what he writes himself as long as he does not discuss 
the theoretical construction of the pure entrepreneur itself. Then, Kirzner refers to the 
alertness as an historical phenomenon that is not present in all human actions. Kirzner 
presupposes the existence of a price system and the framework provided by the business 
sphere. Kirzner’s entrepreneur is alert to price differentials that he might exploit by buying 
inputs on the cheap market and selling the output on the dear one. The entrepreneurial 
decision, in his words, is “a decision to buy in order to sell subsequently” (Kirzner 1973: 40, 
emphasis added), and pure entrepreneurial profit is “the difference between the two sets of 
prices” (Kirzner 1973: 39).  
This description of entrepreneurial alertness fits the enterprise in the business sphere 
perfectly. After all, enterprises are mostly about buying low in order to sell high. They are and 
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must be alert to price differentials in order to make sense at all. In contrast to Kirzner’s pure 
entrepreneur, however, the enterprise is able to bear uncertainty. Up to the amount of its entity 
capital it can make good for losses. The enterprise, because it is based on capital, can perform 
the function of alertness even in a world of change where not all seemingly profitable 
opportunities ex ante turn out to be profitable ex post. 
 
3.2 Entrepreneurship as creative destruction 
In principle, Schumpeter does not describe a fundamentally different process than Kirzner. 
What he does do is to tell the story the other way round. His entrepreneurs also try to exploit 
profitable opportunities. Yet, in order to do so, they have to destroy the existing equilibrium, 
not to generate it. If they want to make profit, they have to establish new combinations of the 
production factors. The function of Schumpeter’s entrepreneurs is to be the leaders in this 
process of creative destruction of the old and the establishment of the new. They pull the 
production factors out of the combinations where they have been integrated before and put 
them into more profitable ones.   
Similar to Kirzner (1973), this description of the functions of the entrepreneur omits the 
problem of uncertainty (Kanbur 1980; Barreto 1989: 30; Hébert and Link 2009: 74). 
Schumpeter’s entrepreneur does not have to bear losses. There is no negative counterpart to 
the profit the entrepreneur makes. Profit is paid for the new combinations of production 
factors, for the development the entrepreneur creates (Schumpeter 1911: 235), but losses do 
not have to concern the entrepreneur. That is not to say that Schumpeter overlooks the 
uncertainty of these actions altogether; yet, uncertainty is not taken on by the entrepreneurs 
qua entrepreneurs, but by the capitalists who fund them and who, in the end, also carry the 
losses (Schumpeter 1911: 217). Schumpeter’s pure entrepreneur, like Kirzner’s, does not own 
capital (Foss and Klein 2012: 32). 
It is easy to see that Schumpeter does not succeed in his attempt to isolate the entrepreneur 
from the capitalist. The entrepreneurs’ function to break the production factors out of their 
present employment and to newly combine them presupposes that they possess these factors 
so that they can dispose over them. But in the capitalist system, the power to do so, according 
to Schumpeter (1911: 165 ff.), is provided not by the entrepreneurs themselves, but by the 
capitalists or the banking system in the form of purchasing power (Metcalfe 2004:165). In the 
market economy, creative destruction can only be accomplished by combining the 
entrepreneur – the leader – with the capitalist who provides the necessary purchasing power. 
More importantly, this destruction results in profit or loss. To argue, like Schumpeter does, 
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that the remuneration for creative destruction goes to the entrepreneurs when it is positive, but 
to the capitalists when it is negative, surely begs the question of whether it makes sense to 
speak of two separate functions. The entrepreneur and the capitalist cannot be separated in the 
explanation of creative destruction. Again, it is the enterprise, not the “pure” entrepreneur, 
which performs the function attributed to the entrepreneur.      
Unlike Schultz (1975: 833) maintains, Schumpeter does not confine the entrepreneurial 
function exclusively to the business sphere, but considers more or less all economic players to 
behave entrepreneurially (Demsetz 1983: 276; also Kalantaridis 2004: 22). Yet he pays due 
attention to the way the market economy is organized which is why it is easy to extract from 
his own writing how his view dovetails with the business sphere as presented in section 2. 
Schumpeter (1911: ch. 3) discusses in detail the questions as to how entrepreneurs are able to 
enforce the new combinations in the economic system of capitalism and why they actually do 
it. In the original German edition, he even added a long appendix to the section on capital, 
which has been (partly) translated into English only lately (Biondi 2008), where he delves into 
financial accounting as actually performed by enterprises. In this whole discussion 
Schumpeter obviously embeds the process of creative destruction in the business sphere of the 
market economy. His entrepreneur needs money in order to pull the production factors out of 
their current assignment, and the ultimate goal of this process of creative destruction is to earn 
money. Obviously, Schumpeter’s story corresponds perfectly to the role of the enterprise in 
the business sphere. As against the pure and property-less entrepreneur, however, the 
enterprise can actually perform the function of creative destruction as it has, in its entity 
capital, the financial power to bear the losses that might result because of the uncertainty 
involved.  
 
3.3 Entrepreneurship as decision-making under uncertainty  
Ludwig von Mises (1949) served as the model for Kirzner’s later use of the “pure 
entrepreneur” as a mere theoretical construction. Many years before Kirzner, Mises (1949: 
253 f.) had argued that the pure entrepreneur as used in economic theory is only an 
“imaginary figure,” a “methodological makeshift.” Unlike Kirzner, however, Mises does not 
try to isolate, with his entrepreneur, the element of alertness in all human actions, but the 
element of uncertainty. The term entrepreneur refers to “acting man exclusively seen from the 
aspect of the uncertainty inherent in every action” (Mises 1949: 254, emphasis added). Mises 
distinguishes his theoretical construct of the pure entrepreneur clearly from the factors of 
production. He also emphasizes that the pure entrepreneur “does not own capital” and 
13 
 
“remains propertyless” over the course of the production process (Mises 1949: 254). 
Accordingly, Mises runs into the same difficulties as Kirzner does with his penniless 
entrepreneur. 
As it is the function of the pure entrepreneur to deal with uncertainty, he is also the one who, 
according to Mises (1949: 255), “earns profit or suffers loss.” Loss, however, cannot fall onto 
anyone who is property-less. Mises (1949: 254) himself states that losses only affect the 
entrepreneur in so far as he owns funds; otherwise, “they fall upon the lending capitalists.” 
Mises (1949: 254) even admits that the pure entrepreneur, the one who does not own any 
funds, is merely “an employee of the capitalists.” Mises’s pure entrepreneur is, in other 
words, not exposed to uncertainty. This means that his entrepreneur is not able to perform the 
entrepreneurial function as defined by Mises himself – to take on the uncertainty involved in 
human action – without also becoming a capitalist and owning funds. Mises’s pure 
entrepreneur cannot be separated from the capitalist. It is the organizational framework of the 
market economy with its capital-based enterprises that sneaks in through the backdoor once 
more.     
In his treatment of the entrepreneur, which otherwise resembles the one by Mises, Knight 
(1921) comes a little closer to explicitly acknowledging the historical specificity of the 
entrepreneur. Although Knight (1921: 236 f.) also considers uncertainty to be prevalent in all 
human actions, his entrepreneurs do not bear all uncertainty in the economy. Rather they deal 
with a specific form of uncertainty, namely the uncertainty of producing for a market (Knight 
1921: 241). Still, Knight does not want to group the entrepreneur and the capitalist together. 
He concedes at least the possibility, though “rare and improbable,” of a pure and propertyless 
entrepreneur who contributes nothing but the responsibility for the ultimate decisions to the 
production process (Knight 1921: 299 f.). Implicitly, Knight (1921: 355) himself invalidates 
this proposition with his observation that only property can make the guarantee against the net 
loss of a business venture, that is, that only property can bear uncertainty. 
Mises’s and Knight’s approach is carried forward, among others, by Casson (2003) and Foss 
and Klein (2012) who explicitly link the uncertainty-bearing by entrepreneurs to resources 
that are put at risk. This literature scraps the idea of a pure and penniless entrepreneur 
altogether. Ownership and entrepreneurship thus cannot be separated and entrepreneurial 
judgment always “implies asset ownership” (Foss and Klein 2012: 20). This way, a 
historically specific element of the market economy – property rights – seems to be 
introduced into the definition of the entrepreneur as the bearer of uncertainty.  
14 
 
Without any further qualification, however, the mere presence of property rights as such does 
not explain sufficiently how entrepreneurs bear uncertainty and thus perform their function.  
After all, property rights over resources are presupposed in the analysis of all human decision-
making. Even otherwise property-less workers own scarce resources, namely their time and 
their working power, and therefore their choice between leisure and labor is nothing but the 
allocation of scarce resources in the face of uncertainty. That according to the view in 
question the entrepreneur is still a universal phenomenon and all people must be considered to 
be entrepreneurs shines through in Casson and Wadeson (2007: 286) for whom the mere fact 
that entrepreneurial activity has opportunity costs – the commitment of time e.g. – suffices to 
demonstrate that entrepreneurship is based on the ownership of resources. Foss and Klein also 
comprise more or less all human actions within their definition of entrepreneurship. When 
they state that it is the entrepreneur who ultimately decides on the utilization of resources 
(Foss and Klein 2012: 40, 98 f.), they would have to include the worker, the land owner, and 
the capitalist who are all ultimate decision-makers in this sense. When they speak of property 
rights, they simply mean the possession of and the control over resources. A property right, in 
this literature, signifies the ability to freely choose among alternatives and thus turns out as a 
universal category (Hodgson 2015b: 11) – as does their concept of the entrepreneur.  
In accordance with their Austrian approach to capital as a collection of heterogeneous 
producer goods, Foss and Klein (2012, ch. 5) are mainly concerned with the decisions on and 
the control over the use of heterogeneous assets, which is a matter of possession, and not so 
much with the question of how the uncertainty involved in producing for the market is 
actually dealt with by capital-based enterprises which hold property rights in these assets. 
Their universal definition does not isolate the entrepreneur from the owners of the factors of 
production. The distinctive feature of the entrepreneur gets lost if all decision-makers are 
considered to bear uncertainty in the sense that they have to bear the consequences of their 
choices. But once again we observe that, in their actual discussions, the respective authors do 
not adhere to their definitions. They do not deal with all decisions on the utilizations of 
resources, but they nearly exclusively focus on the enterprise in the market economy. The 
uncertainty they are concerned with is not the uncertainty a laborer bears in the face of 
massive lay-offs during an economic crisis, or of a non-commercial forest owner in times of 
increasingly extreme meteorological events. What they are investigating, along the lines of 
Knight (1921: 240 f.), is the uncertainty that is involved in producing not for oneself or on 
order, but for the general market. The investment of actual money – or resources evaluated in 
money – in the production process has uncertain outcomes, and it is this kind of uncertainty 
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that entrepreneurs shoulder: whether they get back what they have invested before. At one 
point, for example, Foss and Klein (2012: 39) explicitly limit their approach to a “market 
setting” and state that they “are mainly interested in a specific kind of uncertainty-bearing, 
namely the deliberate deployment of resources in anticipation of financial gain.” In short, 
what is at issue is a historically specific phenomenon, i.e., the uncertainty that is implied in 
the Marxian formula Money – Commodity – Money’, the scheme which describes the actions 
of enterprises in the business sphere of capitalism.  
 
4. How and why the enterprise organizes the production process  
Although they fail to isolate the entrepreneur from the capitalist, the theories of the 
entrepreneur presented in the last section do not have to be discarded. It must only be made 
clear that they are not theories of the entrepreneur as a theoretical construct, but are rather 
theories of the enterprise in the business sphere of capitalism. It is easily possible to 
reinterpret them such that they perfectly harmonize with the idea of the enterprise as a 
fictional person, created by accounting and based on capital, and that organizes production by 
maximizing monetary profit. What is more, when these theories become embedded in the 
business sphere and freed from the theoretical construction of the pure entrepreneur, they 
make important contributions to the understanding of how enterprises actually organize the 
production process under capitalism.  
Let us begin with Knight’s and Mises’s theory of the entrepreneur as the bearer of 
uncertainty. This approach might not be able to isolate the pure entrepreneur, but it strongly 
helps to understand the reason for the existence of the business sphere in the first place. If we 
substitute, in this theory, the enterprise for the entrepreneur, it becomes obvious why it is the 
enterprise which ends up deciding on the use of the production factors.  
As was shown above, all actors, not only enterprises (or entrepreneurs), bear uncertainty. 
What demarcates the enterprise from other actors when it comes to the bearing of uncertainty 
is that the uncertainty it bears arises because it provides (relative) certainty for others. This 
becomes obvious in Knight’s (1921: 271 ff.) discussion of the non-contractual character of 
profit. Profit is a residual income. Its height is not and cannot be fixed in advance. In contrast, 
wages, rent, and interest are contractual incomes. Their recipients are freed from the necessity 
to produce for an uncertain market as they receive a fixed remuneration from an enterprise 
independently of the ultimate outcome. This does not mean that they do not have to face any 
uncertainty. For various reasons, their contracts might unexpectedly be terminated, or not 
prolonged, or even defaulted on by the employing enterprise. But as long as the contracts 
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hold, they are exempt from the uncertainty of producing for the market which is regularly 
accompanied by losses. Inasmuch as an enterprise pays wages, rent, and interest, that is, 
contractual income, it assumes uncertainty for others by creating a kind of certainty that 
otherwise would not exist.  
The idea that it is the function of the entrepreneur to organize the production process, and 
therefore to bear the uncertainty of producing for the market, has already been indicated by 
Cantillon (1755). It was later developed by Say (1803) and Hawley (1927) (see Barreto 1989: 
ch. 1). Hawley in particular recognized that the entrepreneur cannot be put on equal footing 
with the factors of production. According to him, the factors of production do not combine, 
they are combined. “The entrepreneur is the only combiner of the three subsidiary productive 
factors” (Hawley 1927: 417). In Hawley’s words, the entrepreneur “dominates the whole 
productive process” (1927: 414) and “is necessarily the governing factor in economic 
activity” (1927: 415). In the terminology of this paper, I would summarize Hawley’s point by 
saying that the entrepreneur belongs to the sphere which organizes the production process. On 
the other hand, however, Hawley (1927: 419) clearly and explicitly separates the entrepreneur 
from the capitalist. He does not recognize that the function of combining the factors of 
production imperatively necessitates the power to do so. In capitalism, this power is granted 
by capital. Although Hawley is on the right direction, he fails to apply his theory to the 
enterprise but tries to construct a universal theory of the entrepreneur.     
To continue my argument, the reason why production is conducted according to the rules of 
the business sphere, why the owners of factors of production allow profit-oriented enterprises 
to decide upon the use of these factors, is that enterprises grant them some kind of insurance 
by paying them a periodic income that is, at least to some degree, independent of the outcome 
of production. Enterprises do not bear a universal form of uncertainty, but a special form that 
only emerges where there is production for the market. In order to be able to do so, they must 
be based on capital out of which income can be paid without there being a guarantee of 
recovering it later.    
While the uncertainty theory of the entrepreneur, after some reinterpretation, gives a reason 
why capital-based enterprises in the business sphere are able to direct the production process 
in capitalism, it does not explain how these enterprises actually bring order into this process 
and how production is brought to respond to consumer wishes. In this regard, Israel Kirzner’s 
theory of the entrepreneur contributes the decisive argument. Kirzner’s entrepreneurial 
function of alertness, if attributed to the enterprise in the business sphere, perfectly explains 
why profits tend to disappear and how factor costs systematically tend to approach consumer 
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goods’ prices. Braun (2015) has described the way how competition within the business 
sphere and the alertness of enterprises towards price spreads make sure that the allocation of 
the production factors tends to be aligned with consumer preferences. The objective of the 
individual enterprise is to maximize the spread between the money spent on factors of 
production and the money received from selling its products to downstream enterprises or, in 
the end, to consumers. An alert enterprise invests its capital in those industries and lines of 
production where the factors of production are underpriced compared to the consumer 
demand and where therefore large profits are probably to be had by adapting production 
processes. Whether it makes profit or not can easily be verified by its accounting system as 
both costs and revenues are expressed in money terms, or at least can be evaluated in money. 
In profitable lines of production, competition between different alert enterprises brings about 
a tendency of factor costs to rise and product prices to fall. In loss-making industries, the 
opposite will be the case. Consequently, there is a tendency for production factors to move 
into profitable industries and, furthermore, for marginal expenditures on factors to correspond 
to the discounted marginal revenues of product sales. In the (hypothetical) case of 
equilibrium, factors are allocated optimally with regard to consumer preferences. 
The scope of Kirzner’s theory is limited, however, because it takes the price system for 
granted. The enterprise is alert to price differentials and pushes disequilibrium prices toward 
their equilibrium values (Foss and Klein 2012: 65). This implies that it can only help to better 
allocate factors in those production processes that already exist. Mere alertness to prices does 
not explain how new lines of production come into being and complement or supersede 
others. On this point, Schumpeter’s theory of the entrepreneur proves itself helpful. It explains 
how enterprises conquer new markets and extend the business sphere to create and/or 
organize new lines of production, thus provoking technical progress. The assignment of 
creative destruction to the enterprise also provides an explanation as to how prices come into 
being in the first place, that is, how the business sphere develops and spreads.  
True, Schumpeter (1911) assumes as a starting point a circular flow equilibrium where, as in 
Kirzner’s theory, the price system already exists. However, his famous notion of enforcing 
new combinations explicitly covers two cases where the entrepreneur or, in our case, the 
enterprise does not come upon existing prices, but establishes new ones (Schumpeter 1911: 
100 f.). The enforcement of new combinations can mean, among other things, the production 
of a new good or a new quality of a good, and the exploitation of a source of raw materials or 
intermediate goods that has been disregarded or inaccessible before. In both cases, it is not 
possible to draw on already existing prices. One enterprise must be the first one ever to pay a 
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price for a certain good or production factor or the first one ever to put a certain good up for 
sale. In other words, if Schumpeter’s theory is applied to the enterprise, it can explain how 
enterprises drag inputs and outputs into the business sphere and thus spread the organizational 
framework of the market economy.  
All three theories of the entrepreneur taken together provide a fair view on how the business 
sphere with its profit-oriented enterprises organizes the production process under capitalism. 
What remains to be done is to clarify the role the enterprise plays in neoclassical economic 
theory with its focus on equilibrium analysis.  
   
5. The entrepreneur in equilibrium 
The economic theories of the entrepreneur have failed in their attempts to define the 
entrepreneur in a universal way. Their entrepreneurs could all be reduced to an historical 
phenomenon called the enterprise. This entity operates in what has been called the business 
sphere of capitalism and there performs the functions usually ascribed to the entrepreneur. It 
is alert towards profitable spreads in the price system, extends the business sphere to cover 
new ground, and takes on the uncertainty that is involved in an economic system where the 
output of production has to be sold on the market. 
Although it can be argued that the enterprise performs in real life the functions ascribed to the 
entrepreneur by the theories of the entrepreneur, it seems difficult to imagine how the 
enterprise could be integrated into the main body of economic theory. The approach presented 
so far comprises several notable theories of the entrepreneur, and therefore shares their central 
shortcoming: like them, it does not seem to be reconcilable with the equilibrium framework of 
standard economics. Schultz (1975: 828) condensed this point by saying that it is the specific 
task of the entrepreneur “to deal with economic disequilibria.” 
That the entrepreneur does not fit into the equilibrium framework of neoclassical economics is 
generally taken for granted. According to Baumol (1968: 67; 2010: 13 f.), entrepreneurs do 
not have a place and are simply not necessary in standard neoclassical micro. The standard 
model is basically an instrument of optimality analysis of well-defined problems (also 
Demsetz 1983: 274). Households and firms determine their optimal decision values 
simultaneously. Households, in setting their supply of the factors of production, fully take into 
account the firms’ decision on the production of consumer goods and vice versa. The instant 
coordination of the simultaneously set decision values implies that the income of the 
households, i.e., of the factor owners, generates itself. Income is paid as a direct, simultaneous 
– and optimal – reaction to the households’ decision on the amount and the direction of 
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consumption which itself, of course, depends on the households’ income again. The firm, in 
this model, does not provide any room for entrepreneurship, however defined. It is taken to 
perform mathematical calculation in order to yield optimal results for its decision values. No 
separate acting person or entity like the entrepreneur is necessary in this model. 
It has been argued in addition that, after the neoclassical theory of the firm had been 
completed in the 1930s by John Hicks, Paul Samuelson, and R. G. D. Allen, the entrepreneur 
even had to be dropped because otherwise the internal consistency of the theory would have 
been jeopardized (Barreto 1989: chaps. 3-5). 
Despite these discouraging statements, it can be shown that the enterprise and the business 
sphere nonetheless play a central role even in neoclassical micro-theory. They are what can be 
called the historically specific institutional setting behind the notorious assumptions of perfect 
rationality and complete foresight of all decision-makers. In the neoclassical equilibrium 
model, these assumptions are the substitute for an explanation as to how and why the 
allocation of the production factors is perfectly aligned with consumer preferences. To repeat, 
firms and households are simply assumed to know the utility and production functions and to 
be capable of calculating from that the demand and the supply schedules and their optimal 
decision-values (Leibenstein1966: 397). Their behavior is considered optimal in that they 
regain equilibrium instantaneously (Schultz 1975: 829).  
Now, behind this perfect alignment of factors and preferences via omniscient and omnipotent 
decision-makers is nothing but the working of the business sphere as illustrated in figure 1 
and described in section 4. In their trading activities, the enterprises in the business sphere 
translate the technical characteristics of the different production processes and the preferences 
of the consumers and owners of the production factors into market prices. In their attempts to 
maximize the spread between the money spent on factors and the money received from selling 
their products to other enterprises or to consumers, they create a tendency to align the 
production process with the preferences of consumers and factor owners. In equilibrium – the 
theoretical final state of rest – perfect coordination results.   
The business sphere is the precondition of the tendency towards equilibrium. It is the 
institutional setting implicit in neoclassical equilibrium analysis. The coordination of factors 
according to consumer wishes which is, in the model, accomplished by optimizing decision-
makers actually rests upon enterprises calculating in money and trying to make monetary 
profits on top of their invested capital. The business sphere of profit-oriented enterprises, in 
other words, does not and must not disappear in equilibrium. It is implicitly present under the 
guise of the assumption that all decision-makers are perfectly rational and informed. 
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Equilibrium simply denotes the fictional endpoint of the competitive market process, a 
situation where the capital the enterprises are based on does not earn profit any more, but still 
bears interest according to the equilibrium rate.  
There is no reason to assume that outside the institutional setting of the market economy any 
coordination would take place at all, let alone a perfect one. This is not to say that the 
organization of production and the coordination of the different factors could not theoretically 
be accomplished in a different way. The business sphere is the sphere of organization specific 
to capitalism. Other economic systems might find different solutions to the problem. The 
debate on the possibility of economic calculation under socialism has brought to light, 
however, that this will be no easy task and even sympathizers of a socialist economic order 
admit that so far there is “no viable alternative” to the coordination of the complex activities 
of modern economies by markets characterized by profit-oriented enterprises (Hodgson 
2015a, ch. 12). As long as no alternative has been found, the rationale for the assumptions of 
perfect rationality and complete foresight is the working of the business sphere which creates 
the tendency towards the equilibrium which neoclassical theory focuses on. 
 
6. Conclusion               
This paper has demonstrated that in order to find the place of the entrepreneur in economic 
theory we must distinguish two levels: the level of production and the level of organization. 
Whereas production is a universal technical phenomenon, the organization of production is 
historically specific. In the economic system of capitalism, production is organized by 
enterprises which calculate in money and try to maximize their profits by buying low and 
selling high on the market. They operate in what has been called the business sphere, the 
organizational sphere of capitalism where actions are basically oriented by what Marx has 
grasped in his formula Money – Commodity – Money’. 
The theories according to which the entrepreneurial function is either alertness, or creative 
destruction, or uncertainty-bearing, are correct in the sense that each of them focuses on an 
aspect that is important for the enterprise in the business sphere. Yet, they do not locate their 
entrepreneurs in the business sphere but try to put them on equal footing with the technical 
and universal factors of production. Therefore, they all define entrepreneurship as an aspect of 
human action that is present in all historical contexts, not only in capitalism. 
I have shown for each of these theories that they fail to properly isolate the entrepreneurial 
function. At some point or another, they cannot do without implicitly or explicitly introducing 
the ownership of capital as a necessary precondition for those who perform the 
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entrepreneurial function. Based on this result, I have demonstrated that these theories only 
make sense when they are applied to the enterprise within the business sphere of capitalism. 
They then become historically specific theories of the way capitalism is organized. 
Furthermore, it becomes obvious that they are not mutually exclusive, but that each of them 
describes one aspect of the organizational activities of the enterprise. 
By distinguishing the two levels and assigning the entrepreneurial function to the level of 
organization, I was also able to pinpoint the place of the entrepreneur in equilibrium. The 
neoclassical assumptions of perfect rationality and complete foresight of all agents are simply 
a different way of expressing the idea that production is organized perfectly and that we as 
economists do not have to bother with this question while discussing allocative or distributive 
questions. The rationale behind these assumptions, however, is the business sphere with its 
profit-oriented enterprises which tends to align the technical givens with consumer 
preferences. Without this organizational sphere, neither the assumptions nor the resulting 
equilibrium would make sense.     
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